Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the Addyston Pipe Case by Bittlingmayer, George
DECREASING AVERAGE COST AND 
COMPETITION: A NEW LOOK AT THE 
ADDYSTON PIPE CASE* 
GEORGE B1TTUNGMA YER 
University of Michigan 
I . I N T R O D U C T I O N 
L / E G A L scholars know Addyston Pipe as one of three or four turn-
of-the-century cases that established how the Sherman Act was to be 
applied to cartel agreements. Judge William Howard Taft's highly re-
garded court of appeals opinion in Addyston1 not only reinforced the 
tendency, already apparent in Joint Traffic, to regard horizontal price 
fixing as per se illegal but also provided a way of distinguishing presum-
ably harmful cartel agreements from those agreements, like partnerships, 
that promote the public good. "Given the time at which it was wri t ten," 
writes Robert Bork, "Addyston must rank as one of the greatest, if not the 
greatest antitrust opinions in the history of the law." 2 
Industrial organization economists are also familiar with the case, and 
very nearly to a man they regard the agreement among the cast-iron pipe 
producers who were the defendants in Addyston as an example of the 
classic manufacturers' cartel which the antitrust laws have largely elimi-
nated or driven underground. The unfavorable assessment of behavior in 
* This study is based on my dissertat ion, Compet i t ion and the Nature of Costs : The Cast 
I ron Pipe Industry , 1890-1910, and the Case of Addyston Pipe (Universi ty of Chicago . 
1981). I am indebted to Lester Telser , my thesis chai rman, for his generous advice on the 
top ics covered in this s tudy. I also thank Richard Posner and Sherwin Rosen for serving on 
my commi t t ee and for their interest in Addyston. Members of the workshop in Applied Price 
Theo ry at Chicago and the referee for this Journal provided helpful comments , and Yale 
Brozen brought the case to my at tent ion and encouraged my work on it. Financial support 
for this work came from the Liberty F u n d , the Winches ter Foundat ion , and the Charles R. 
Walgreen Foundat ion , and I thank these organizat ions for their help . A special thanks is 
owed to United States Pipe and Foundry , which provided the data. F o r other aspects of this 
t op i c , see my forthcoming article. Price Fixing and the Addyston Pipe Case , 5 Research L . 
& E c o n . (1983). 
1 U .S . v. Addyston Pipe and Steel C o . . 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
- Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (1978) at 26. 
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this industry has been reinforced by the fact that the six firms found guilty 
of price fixing merged while their case was on appeal. This merger appears 
to have gone unnoticed at the time, perhaps because of the simultaneous 
wave of mergers in manufacturing generally. But when the merger of the 
Addyston defendants was discovered and commented on many years 
later, it was interpreted, by implication anyway, as vindication of the 1904 
Northern Securities decision dealing with merger for monopoly and of 
at least some parts of the subsequent legislation restricting horizontal 
m e r g e r s . 3 
The aim of this study is to provide a more detailed analysis of costs in 
the cast- iron pipe industry and to propose what may appear to be a novel 
explanat ion for the cartelization and merger. This explanation has its 
modern roots in recent developments in economic theory, including eco-
nomic game theory and the theory of the core. It is also related to the 
theory of natural monopoly. 
The most startling result to emerge from work in this area is that, 
barr ing only a few special cases, there is no competitive equilibrium in 
an industry composed of independently operated plants with identical, 
U-shaped average cost curves. The cost conditions are, of course, those 
from the textbook case of the Viner industry, but I think many if not most 
economis ts are surprised that this ineluctable result concerning equilib-
rium is contained in the most familiar of models. A broader and more 
practical result is that there is no competitive equilibrium in an industry 
character ized by quite plausible cost and demand conditions. All we need 
for this conclusion is falling long-run average cost, stochastic demand, 
and some cost associated with having idle plants. An implication of these 
largely negative results concerning competition is that some noncompeti-
t ive, cooperative solution to market allocation is necessary. By extension, 
the importance of this line of reasoning for antitrust is that it becomes 
unrealistic to expect competitive behavior in certain markets because 
firms could not behave competitively even if they wanted to. 
While the view that there cannot be a competitive equilibrium in a 
3 S i m o n N . Whi tney, Antitrust Policies in Twenty Industries, vol. 2 (1958) was the first to 
look b e y o n d the case and the related court documents and the first to discuss the merger and 
s u b s e q u e n t deve lopments at any length. Earlier t reatments are either brief commentaries 
b a s e d o n w h a t appears in the Federal Reporter or excerpts from court documents . Among 
t h e s e a r e Wil l iam Z. Ripley, ed . , Trus ts , Pools and Corporations (1905). William Stevens, 
e d . . Indus t r i a l Combinat ions and Trusts (1914), and Henry R. Seager and Charles A. Gulick. 
J r . . T r u s t a n d Corporat ion Problems (1929). Almarin Phillips, Market Structure, Organiza-
t ion a n d Pe r fo rmance (1962), devotes one chapter to the industry and case and presents 
s o m e n e w a n d useful material. As far as I know, the merger was first mentioned in connec-
t ion wi th the case by Wendell Berge in an unpublished address before the sixtieth annual 
c o n v e n t i o n of the American Economic Association (held in Chicago in December 1947). See 
the R e p o r t o f the Federal Trade Commission on the Merger Movement (1948) at 8-9. 
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market may appear novel, it is in fact closely related to the way Alfred 
Marshall, J. M. Clark, and other economists looked at short-run pricing in 
a market. Marshall made a special effort to point out that the notion of 
competitive equilibrium was to be interpreted only as a long-run concept, 
and Clark devoted several of his works to advancing the view that margi-
nal cost pricing—which is what competition implies—would not enable 
firms to recover their costs. There was, in fact, a general concern among 
economists in the period before World War II with "'ruinous" and "cut-
throat" competition and with the question of stability in markets. Unfor-
tunately, interest in these topics, at least with a view toward application, 
has largely dried up since the late forties. It is true that our understanding 
of the related issue of natural monopoly pricing has increased, and this is 
partly due to the substantial effort devoted to a reconciliation of the 
appropriate marginal conditions with the goal of making natural 
monopolies pay their own way. 4 But it has not been generally recognized 
that the most fruitful distinction between a natural monopoly and many 
other industries is one of degree and not kind, and, consequently, that 
these other industries must themselves settle problems which the theory 
of natural monopoly says have no competitive solution and with which the 
regulatory bodies deal only imperfectly. 
So, while the implication of increasing returns or nonconvexity for 
market equilibrium has been explored in theoretical research, there has 
been no general recognition that the difficulties that arise in economic 
models have their counterpart in real markets. When most economists 
imagine a price-fixing conspiracy, I think they have at the back of their 
minds the competitive market model in which traders either have convex 
preferences (this implies no increasing returns for sellers) or have non-
convex preferences but are small relative to the market. In the first case, it 
turns out that the assumption of small numbers, which makes the idea of 
collusion manageable, poses no necessary obstacle to competition. In the 
second case, however, the assumption of small numbers is a serious in-
consistency and is incompatible with competition. These observations 
suggest that explicit cartelization, tacit collusion, and horizontal merger 
can be viewed, in many instances, as the noncompetitive arrangements 
that the firms in an industry must necessarily adopt. Whether the resulting 
arrangements are in any sense optimal is another matter, and in some 
cases it may turn out to be correct to substitute government regulation or 
4 Ronald H. Coase , The Marginal Cost Controversy , 13 Economica 169 (1946). presents 
the a rguments in favor of such a reconciliation and advocates multipart pricing. William J. 
Baumol . Quasi Optimality: The Price We Must Pay for a Price System, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 578 
(1979), shows that, from a global view, constant unit prices will in general imply a loss of 
welfare. For a summary of the modern natural monopoly literature see W. W. Sharkey, The 
Theory of Natural Monopoly (1982). 
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ownership for self-regulation. An adequate discussion of this issue would 
involve a review of the theory of the firm and other topics that are best left 
to a separate treatment. 
The plan of this study is as follows. Sections II and III present a brief 
summary of the relevant economic theory. This theory emphasizes the 
stringent conditions necessary for a competitive equilibrium and shows 
that competitive, marginal-cost pricing is not in general feasible in an 
industry characterized by increasing returns. Section IV describes the 
technology of cast-iron pipe production and suggests how the nature of 
this technology affects short- and long-run costs. Sections V and VI ex-
amine detailed accounting records for eleven cast-iron plants, including 
five of the six Addyston defendants. Cost data of this sort are extremely 
rare, even for a famous antitrust case; but the results by and large 
confirm, not the economist's textbook drawing of cost curves, but rather 
the businessman's idea of how costs behave. Some expenses are largely 
fixed and do not vary with output; others vary directly with output but 
with no hint of increasing marginal cost over observed output ranges. This 
last finding does not imply irrationality but is consistent with the view that 
the optimal industry response to uncertainty entails slack capacity, at 
most times. Section VII presents estimates of short-run cost functions and 
takes into account an important source of bias. Finally, Section VIII 
presents the conclusions. Let me add that I do not take up the events in 
this industry directly. The emphasis is on the conditions necessary for 
competition and on the nature of costs. 
II. C O M P E T I T I O N I N V I N E R I N D U S T R I E S 
The classic market model is characterized by a fundamental and long-
recognized instability, which is illustrated in Figure 1. Consider an indus-
try composed of two plants that have the familiar U-shaped average cost 
curves. Marginal cost in this industry is a discontinuous function of total 
industry output and is equal to the minimum average cost of the plants at 
two points, Q, and Q2. Suppose that the rate of demand faced by this 
industry is given by the curve labeled D. Will industry equilibrium call for 
the operation of one or of two plants? If two plants are operating, compe-
tition will result in a price equal to marginal cost; but since marginal cost 
is less than average cost, both plants will incur losses. If one plant shuts 
down, the remaining one will make profits. But this makes it possible for 
the idle plant to strike a bargain with the buyers who are paying high 
prices, thereby undercutting the active plant. It should be clear that an 
increase in demand and in the number of firms does not alter the problem 
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in any fundamental way, at least not until the number of firms becomes 
very large. 
Jacob Viner, who developed the analysis of industries with U-shaped 
average cost curves , was apparently aware of this problem. In his classic 
expository article, "Cos t Curves and Supply Curves,'" Viner considers 
the case in which there are constant industry costs because all existing 
firms and an indefinite number of potential entrants face the same long-run 
average cost curve (which has a minimum). "Here . . . actual long-run 
price and output for the industry would oscillate above and below stable 
points of equilibrium price o u t p u t . " 5 Judging by this comment and an 
elaboration of the same point in the next paragraph, Viner appears to be 
addressing the same issue. 
Lester Telser has recently made a detailed investigation of equilibrium 
in this familiar market model, using the theory of the core.G It turns out 
that no competitive equilibrium exists for almost all rates of demand if 
plants have identical U-shaped average cost curves. An exception occurs 
if demand is such that it crosses the marginal cost curve at a point where 
marginal cost equals average cost, which implies that plant cost functions 
5 J a c o b Viner. Cost Cu rves and Supply Curves , 3 Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie 23 
(1931). repr inted in George J. Stigler and Kenneth Boulding. eds . . Readings in Price Theory 
(1952) at 212. This passage in Viner is discussed in Lester Telser . Economic Theory and the 
C o r e (1978) at 387. The earliest work to focus on this topic , ra ther than treating it as a loose 
e n d as Viner does , appea r s to be George Cady. Entrepreneural [sic | Costs and Price (1942). 
K L e s t e r Telser , supra note 5, at 106-16. 
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exhibit constant returns to scale at that point. William Baumol arrives at 
similar conclusions in his discussions of optimal pricing in a world that 
exhibits increasing and decreasing returns. 7 
I I I . C O M P E T I T I O N I N I N D U S T R I E S W I T H U N C E R T A I N D E M A N D A N D 
I N C R E A S I N G R E T U R N S 
The results in the previous section are clear and straightforward. No 
competitive equilibrium exists for almost any rate of demand in an indus-
try whose firms have identical U-shaped average cost curves. More 
difficult problems arise when we want to employ a theoretical structure 
that bears some resemblance to the facts we actually encounter. 
Specifically, we would like to be able to analyze the combined influence of 
uncertainty and increasing returns. We will take uncertainty to apply only 
to demand, because this approach illuminates the problem without need-
less complications. Increasing returns over some range are also a neces-
sary ingredient in our analysis, and indeed it would be foolhardy to deny 
the practical importance of increasing returns. Decreases in the scale of 
operation of every sort of economic activity, from the production of s teel 
to the production of chocolate chip cookies, will eventually result in 
higher average cost. But attached to this important fact of life is an equal ly 
important observation: a size distribution of plants covering an a p p r e -
ciable range is consistent with increasing returns over that range. The opt i -
mal use of resources under uncertainty will imply the use of l a rge , 
efficient plants as well as small, inefficient ones. Whether we will in fact 
see the optimal distribution emerge in an industry is another mat ter , al-
though the evidence indicates that something like it does emerge. 
The results presented below are drawn from work by William Sha rkey 
and Telser, and the interested reader is directed there for a fuller t reat-
ment. 8 The concern here will be to provide a summary of those theoret ica l 
results that provide insight into the apparent failure of competition in the 
cast-iron pipe industry. Specifically, it turns out that if plants have avoid-
able costs related to capacity—that is, lump-sum costs that are i n c u r r e d at 
positive output rates but not if output is zero—and if there are fixed costs 
to having plants so long as they exist, then competitive solutions a r e not 
possible in the short run (the period for which the decision to shut d o w n is 
made). A related finding is that decreasing long-run average cos t s in the 
industry will prevent firms from recovering their expenses under t h e op-
timal output paths if they are restricted to short-run marginal cost p r i c ing . 
7 William Baumol, supra note 4. 
s William Walker Sharkey. A Study of Markets Involving Increasing R e t u r n s a n d U n c e r -
tain Demand (Ph.D. diss . , Univ. of Chicago, 1973) and Telser , supra no te 5, at c h . 2 . 
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Sharkey's analysis is based on a market in which plants incur fixed 
c o s t s , / + gq, w h e r e / and g are constants and q is plant capacity. Plants 
also incur lump-sum avoidable costs at positive output rates that are linear 
homogeneous functions of capacity. Two results concerning the correct 
industry response are of interest. First, the optimal collection of plants if 
the probability distribution of the number of identical demanders is uni-
form and restricted to the interval [0, R] will call for a size distribution of 
plants such that each plant is twice as large as the next. In addition, as 
fixed costs increase, the optimal solution calls for a smaller number of 
plants. More general results would be desirable, but unfortunately the 
analytical difficulties make progress difficult. There is to date no general 
solution to the problem of the optimal size distribution of plants in a Viner 
industry with U-shaped or declining long-run average cost and uncertain 
demand. 9 One important general observation to emerge from this work, 
however, is that if fixed costs are zero, then an infinite number of plants of 
different sizes is costlessly available. Thus, any particular level of demand 
could be met with one active plant operating at full capacity. Under more 
realistic circumstances it will be necessary for plants to operate below 
capacity or for some demand in excess of minimum average cost to go 
unsatisfied. It is this that sets the stage for Sharkey's second major result, 
namely, that there is no competitive equilibrium for almost all rates of 
demand that call for two or more plants. The fundamental difficulty is that 
the globally optimal solution, which normally calls for some slack capac-
ity at active plants or some unsatisfied demand in excess of minimum 
average cost because of the limited number of plants, is incompatible with 
the desire of plant owners and buyers to realize the gains from operating 
plants at minimum average cost, which is the locally optimal solution. The 
more familiar statement is that competition for buyers prevents plants 
from covering their costs. 
Transportation and heavy manufacturing industries provide a rich 
source of examples that have this sort of cost structure and the problems 
that go with it. Consider the production of cement, an activity that is 
characterized by uncertain demand, economies of scale, and substantial 
avoidable costs. For simplicity assume that the several plants serving an 
area are located close enough together so that differences in transporta-
tion cost to their customers are negligible. (This is not a crucial assump-
tion. It is an easy matter to construct examples with dispersed plants and 
customers that have the same results.) Under arbitrary, realized rates of 
9 Obviously, similar technical problems concerning the optimal size distribution of plants 
arise if demand is certain and variable. If demand is fixed, the optimal size distribution of 
plants in the case of increasing returns calls for one large plant. 
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demand, marginal cost pricing will often result in prices that are too low to 
cover all costs, even only the variable costs of production. The basic 
problem is that it is not possible to change plant sizes costlessly to run at 
minimum average cost for any particular rate of demand. Note that this 
would not necessarily thwart a competitive outcome if small plants were 
not more expensive to operate than large ones. In fact, it is possible for 
firms to compete and recover their costs in the case of uncertain demand if 
there are constant returns and, therefore, no penalties for small plants. 1 0 
The third major result from this work by Sharkey and Telser on market 
equilibrium is that restrictions on recontracting will allow an equilibrium 
to emerge. A sufficient condition for the emergence of an equilibrium is 
that all supply or all demand be under the control of one agent. This 
restriction prevents one group composed of some plant owners and some 
buyers from undermining arrangements that cover costs. Theoretical re-
sults of this sort suggest that a variety of business practices that appear 
anticompetitive can be interpreted as attempts to achieve stabilization in a 
market. In an industry with seasonal fluctuations, for example, a firm may 
ask some of its buyers to commit themselves to buy all of a yea r s re-
quirements from that firm. This was the case in the cast-iron pipe indus-
try. Under other circumstances it can lead to state control of the enter-
prises or to state-sanctioned collusion. Of course, there may also be 
private-sector collusion in the form of price fixing or geographic restric-
tions on dealings. 1 1 
1 0 See Eytan Sheshinski and Jacques H. Dreze , Demand Fluctuat ions , Capacity Ut i l iza-
tion, and Costs, 66 Am. Econ. Rev. 731 (1976), for results based on the assumption that all 
plant cost curves are identical but the number of plants need not be an integer. It may in fact 
be useful to compare briefly some aspects of their analysis , in particular Section II ( " P r o p o -
sitions for a Simple Model with Uncertain D e m a n d " ) , with Sharkey ' s and Telser 's r e s u l t s 
summarized above. In Sheshinski and Dreze ' s model industry demand is a random var i ab le 
with zero-price elasticity and "firms are set up before the level of output is known. Outpu t is 
then allocated equally among firms." In o ther w o r d s , variations in industry demand a r e 
never met by shutting down plants. Also, the assumpt ion of fractional plants with the s a m e 
minimum average cost as whole plants implies cons tant re turns . Based on these a s s u m p -
tions, they find that ' compet i t ion," in the sense of individual profit maximizing b e h a v i o r 
and free entry and exit in response to expected profits and losses, leads to the soc ia l ly 
efficient allocations. However, it will not in general be possible to obtain this result if (a) t h e 
number of identical plants is restricted to integer values (this is a special case of inc reas ing 
returns), or (b) plant costs are such that it makes sense to shut plants down for pa r t i cu la r 
realized rates of demand. 
" The issues raised here are related to a more general quest ion: Why do economic a g e n t s 
use the price system in some c i rcumstances but not in o thers? The difficulties raised b y 
increasing returns and fixed costs can be viewed as creating a variety of market failure t ha t 
can be overcome with appropriate restrictions on the behavior of buyers and sellers, t ha t is , 
with a partial suppression of the market . These difficulties can also be eliminated o r r e d u c e d 
by vertical or horizontal integration, but these solutions may be more costly to i m p l e m e n t 
(antitrust considerations aside). The modern theory of the firm, which suggests this ap -
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This kind of short-run analysis answers the question whether a compet-
itive market can arise in an industry; once plants in an industry exist, will 
competition allow them to operate harmoniously? A related problem is 
whether firms can be induced to enter an industry with competitive pric-
ing. The simplest case to analyze is the one in which industry costs are an 
increasing function of capacity and output. Take the special case where 
total industry costs are determined by the function TC = K + K~0cq2, 
where K is the fixed cost incurred regardless of output, c is a constant, 
and q is current output . The second term on the right represents the 
variable costs. If there are two states of the world, and if marginal benefit 
(demand) in state 1 is «, — bq and in state 2 is a2 - bq, where a, ^ a2, then 
setting prices equal to short-run marginal cost will not in general lead to 
the recovery of costs under the optimal output path. In particular, if /3 > 
1, which implies increasing returns, then this policy will lead to losses on 
average. This result is, of course, related to well-known conclusions from 
the natural monopoly l i terature. 1 2 
It is of course true that the possibility of storing output mitigates the 
problems faced by independent firms operating under increasing returns. 
For example, if it is costless to hold inventories, firms in a Viner industry 
facing uncertain demand could operate at minimum average cost and sell 
their output at a price equal to that cost. In practice, however, inventories 
are costly, and this calls for firms to meet varying demand in part by 
changing the rate of production. This is especially likely to be true in in-
stances where output is not homogeneous, as it was in the case of cast-
iron pipe because of the range of pipe sizes. In still other cases—the gen-
eration of electricity, for example—storing output is nearly impossible. 
Now, while this conclusion concerning the feasibility of competition 
and the function of market collusion may appear to be out of step with 
much of economic thinking, the analysis is in fact closely related to other 
work in industrial organization. First, the view that competition is un-
stable was widely shared by economists in the 1920s and 1930s, and with a 
fairly good, albeit intuitive, recognition of the principles involved. 1 3 Sec-
p r o a c h , begins with Ronald C o a s e , The Na tu re of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937) and has 
been e labora ted by Oliver E. Wi l l iamson, Marke ts and Hierarchies (1975), a m o n g o the r s . 
1 2 See , for e x a m p l e , He rbe r t Mohr ing , The Peak Load Pricing Problem with Increasing 
R e t u r n s and Pricing C o n s t r a i n t s , 60 A m . Econ . Rev . 693 (1970). A detailed analysis of the 
cond i t ions under which shor t - run marginal cost pricing al lows the recovery of cos t , together 
with implicat ions for the s ta tus of the co re , is provided by Telser , supra note 5, at 117-29. 
1 3 Alfred Marsha l l , for e x a m p l e , pointed out that a decline in d e m a n d could lead to 
marginal cost pricing but that p r ices se ldom fall that low, both because of " fea r of spoiling 
the m a r k e t " and to allow p r o d u c e r s to c o v e r their general e x p e n s e s . See Alfred Marshal l , 
Pr inciples of E c o n o m i c s (8th e d . , 1920, reset and repr inted in 1949), at 3 1 1 - 1 3 , as well as 
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ond, the idea that complete freedom of contract is economically intracta-
ble, or at least inefficient, is actually fairly familiar. Most economists 
would agree that restrictions on transactions promote efficient outcomes 
in certain situations. For example, copyrights, patents, resale price 
maintenance, franchise agreements, and covenants not to compete pro-
hibit certain forms of competition. The justification for these restrictions 
is that they allow certain types of socially beneficial expenses to be cov-
ered. Viewed in this light, the significance of the agreement and merger 
among the Addyston defendants may be that they provide an instance in 
which a competitive outcome could not be sustained and in which cartel 
restrictions promoted the production of a good by allowing firms to cove r 
their costs. 
IV. T H E T E C H N O L O G Y O F C A S T - I R O N P I P E P R O D U C T I O N A N D 
S O M E F A C T S A B O U T T H E I N D U S T R Y 
Clearly, our discussion of competition emphasizes the importance of 
costs. There are in fact several ways of investigating costs in this ca se . In 
this section I will look at some of the features of cast-iron pipe product ion 
that have a bearing on how costs vary with output for a given plant and 
with plant size. It also provides a summary of some basic facts conce rn ing 
the industry that are relevant to competition. In Section V, I introduce the 
cost data provided by United States Pipe and Foundry for eleven tu rn -
of-the-century cast-iron pipe plants and suggest why a large fraction of 
these expenses do not vary in strict proportion to output. Sections VI and 
VII investigate how costs vary by plant size and how they vary w i th 
output. The chief results are that economies of scale do exist and that 
marginal costs over the observed output ranges were roughly c o n s t a n t 
and below average costs. Each of the three approaches—the ana ly s i s of 
production technology, the detailed examination of accounting r e c o r d s , 
Book V passim. In his discussion of increasing returns Marshall a rgues that " t h e t h e o r y of 
equilibrium of normal demand and supply helps indeed to give definiteness to o u r i d e a s ; and 
in its elementary stages does not diverge from the actual facts of life. . . . But w h e n p u s h e d to 
its more remote and intricate logical consequences , it slips from the cond i t ions of r e a l l i f e . " 
Id. at 381-82. J. M. Clark had substantially the same view. " I n theory , the s a m e a r g u m e n t 
which is used to show how competition brings prices down to cost . . . can be u s e d t o p r o v e 
conclusively that competition tends to force prices down to differential [marg ina l ] c o s t , if 
existing productive capacity will supply the demand at that pr ice . And a s i n d u s t r y i s in a 
chronic state of partly idle capacity, to insist that producers shall c o m p e t e u n c h e c k e d 
appears to amount to inviting competition, and private enterpr ise wi th i t , t o c o m m i t 
suicide." John Maurice Clark, Studies in the Economics of O v e r h e a d Cos t s ( 1 9 2 3 ) a t 135. 
Clark reiterated this point in Toward a Concept of Workable Compet i t ion , 30 A m . E c o n . 
Rev. 241 (1940), where he noted that perfect competition requires ave rage and m a r g i n a l cost 
to be equal. 
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and statistical cost analysis—leads to the conclusion that the cost condi-
tions in this industry are inconsistent with an unrestricted competitive 
equilibrium. 
The process by which cast-iron pipe was manufactured is relatively 
simple and remained unchanged from the middle of the nineteenth century 
until the 1920s when centrifugal casting was adopted. 1 4 Pig iron was 
melted and poured into vertical sand-lined molds, and the cast pipe was 
dipped into a hot coal-pitch bath. The process required considerable 
amounts of fuel. Coke was used to melt the iron, coke and coal were used 
to dry the sand molds, and the cast pipes had to be heated to 300 degrees 
before being dipped in the coal pitch. 
The maximum possible rate of output at a plant appears to have been 
governed by certain technical features. The cupolas in which the pig iron 
was melted had to be cooled off, cleaned, and repaired once a day after a 
maximum of twelve to sixteen hours of operation. Melting capacity at 
foundries was determined by the sizes and capacities of the cupolas and 
by the number of pits into which the molds could be placed while the iron 
solidified. Another operation that had some bearing on capacity was the 
drying of molds and cores (the two parts of the form into which the molten 
iron was poured). The number of forms that could be handled was limited 
by the sizes and capacities of the drying ovens. Molds were prepared one 
day, dried overnight, and used the next. 
There are certain other technical considerations that deserve our atten-
tion. Data presented below suggest that large foundries enjoyed econo-
mies of scale. From what do these economies arise? A brief discussion of 
the cupola will illustrate the sorts of savings that are possible. A cupola is 
fundamentally a cylindrical furnace into which layers of pig iron and coke 
are placed. It is very efficient from a technical standpoint because the fuel 
is in direct contact with the metal. The layers are melted progressively 
from the bottom to the top, and the molten pig iron that collects at the 
bottom is tapped into a ladle. As molten iron is run off, new layers of iron 
and coke are placed on top of the old from an opening halfway up the side 
of the cupola. 
It is clear that at least several workers were required for the continuous 
operation of a furnace. For units with daily capacities of only sixty to 100 
1 4 The following summary of technology and market condit ions comes from these 
s o u r c e s : William D. Moore , Development of the Cast Iron Pressure Pipe Industry in the 
S o u t h e r n States, 1800-1938 (1939); J. B. N a u , Metal Mixers for Pipe Foundr ies , The Iron 
A g e . June 8, 1905, at 1824; Henry Jeffers Noble , History of the Cast Iron Pressure Pipe 
Indus t ry in the United States of America (1940); John Shoup . Modern Foundry Practice 
(1900); William C. Stimpson and Burton L. Gray, Foundry Work (1944); and various docu-
men t s contained in the Transcript of Record of the Supreme Court of the United States . 
O c t o b e r Term 1899, N o . 51: Addys ton Pipe and Steel v. the United States . 
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tons, which we shall see is near the minimum efficient size, six men with 
separate duties attended a single cupola. But it does not seem plausible 
that doubling the cupola diameter would more than double the number of 
workers required to service it; in fact, one would expect a less than 
proportional increase. Yet doubling the diameter from thirty to sixty 
inches resulted in a three- to fourfold increase in the average melting rate 
because melting capacity depends on the surface area of the floor of the 
cupola, and this increases according to irr2. On the other hand, to the 
degree that cleaning and relining costs and radiation heat loss depend on 
the surface area of the sides, these costs increase only in direct proportion 
to the diameter. If we let h be the height of the cupola, then the surface 
area is directly proportional to the radius and equals lirrh. 
Obviously, then, there are good reasons why it might be cheaper per 
ton to melt 200 tons of pig iron each day rather than only 100 tons. 
Moreover, there are clear inefficiencies in the application of variable fac-
tors if we melt only 100 tons per day in a 200-ton furnace. Essentially the 
same crew will have to be used, although for a shorter period, since 
considerable waste resulted if a cupola of specific capacity was run at an 
hourly rate different from what it was designed for. Slag buildup and fuel 
waste were two major sources of inefficiency. It was also true that the 
start-up procedures and cleanup were largely unaffected by the size of the 
daily run. Thus, if only half the iron of a full-capacity run was melted, it is 
not at all likely that only half the labor and fuel costs were incurred. 
According to these observations, we should not be surprised to find that 
there are economies in the application of variable factors. 1 5 
The structure of the industry in 1890 is easily determined because the 
U.S. Census Office chose to make a special study of it for the census of 
that year. 1 6 Thirty-six establishments were reported as primarily engaged 
in the manufacture of cast-iron pipe. Of these, two were not in operation 
the year of the census. The largest cluster of firms was in New Jersey and 
eastern Pennsylvania. Together, these two states had twelve of the 
thirty-six firms. This area had been the center of pipe production in the 
early years of the industry and still accounted for 43 percent of the U.S. 
production in 1890. Eleven of the fourteen plants in operation west and 
south of Ohio were constructed after 1880. Nationwide, twenty of the 
thirty-six plants were built in that decade. A curious fact regarding the 
construction between 1880 and 1890 is that the new southern mills tended 
1 5 Eliot Jones , The Principles of Railway Transportat ion (1921) at ch. 4 presents a similar 
but more detailed explanation of the factors that contribute to declining average cost in 
railroading. Also of interest is his treatment of " ru inous compet i t ion" in ch . 5. 
1 6 U .S . Census Office, Department of the Interior, Cast Iron Pipe Industry, in Report on 
Manufacturing Industries in the United States: 1890, Part III, Selected Industries 487. 
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to be of large capacity, while the new mills in Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey were of small capacity. This and the somewhat lower pig-iron 
prices that the southern firms enjoyed led them to be considered the 
low-cost producers. The mill at Anniston. Alabama, was built in 1889 and, 
according to one authority, was " the largest pipe and foundry in the world 
at the time of its bui lding." 1 7 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of cast-iron pipe producers as 
presented in the special study in the 1890 census report. The New Jersey 
firms were apparently the largest on average, and several had two or more 
plants of various vintages at the same site or a few miles apart. They seem 
also to have produced a lower fraction of nonpipe output, probably be-
cause there were other foundries in the Northeast that specialized in the 
production of pipe fittings, gates, valves, and related products. The New 
Jersey firms sold a substantial fraction of their output abroad. Although 
the firms in Ohio and the South were remarkably similar, on average, in 
size and in composition of output, this conceals the diversity of plant sizes 
in the South. The plants in Texas and Virginia were small, while those in 
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Alabama were fairly large. 
A significant feature of the industry was that output was expensive 
to transport. Cast-iron pipe was priced at $ 15—$30 per ton f.o.b. (this 
varied with the price of pig iron), while transportation costs ranged from 
$2 to $6 per ton, depending on the distance. Plants were also clustered 
because of site advantages. In the mid-1890s, for example, four of the six 
Addyston defendants were located in northern Alabama and southeastern 
Tennessee . They sold very little of their output in the South but did sell a 
considerable amount to the growing cities of the Midwest such as Chicago 
and Milwaukee. They had lower production costs, and the substantial 
shipping costs for pipe, which did not increase in proportion to distance 
shipped, made it difficult for firms in the East or even Ohio to compete. 
Since these few firms were located so close together, and since they had a 
common natural market, the effect was to accentuate the problems posed 
by fixed costs that might, under other circumstances, be less severe. Note 
also that this clustering of several independent plants does not imply that 
the largest plant has exhausted the economies of scale. 
V. T H E T Y P E S O F P L A N T C O S T 
Four of the defendants in Addyston merged in 1898, forming American 
Pipe and Foundry, and in 1899 United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry 
(USCIP & F) was formed by adding the two remaining defendants and five 
1 7 N o b l e , supra note 14, at 74. 
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other firms. Two defendants had two-plant operations, and one additional 
plant was added in 1900. The data which we have cover the twelve-month 
period beginning in June 1905. At this time USCIP & F had fourteen 
plants, of which three were permanently shut down. Two plants, located 
at Buffalo, New York, and West Superior, Wisconsin, were operated 
during only some of these twelve months. The other nine operating plants 
were located in each of the industry's three major producing areas: the 
Delaware River Valley (where USCIP & F had one plant); Ohio, north-
ern Kentucky, and western Pennsylvania (five plants); and northern 
Alabama and southern Tennessee (three plants). By this time several 
new firms had established themselves in Ohio and in the South, particu-
larly in Birmingham. The other firms in the industry all operated at only 
one or two sites. 
The data are monthly figures on sales, output, inventory, direct and 
indirect costs , and eleven other series for each of the eleven operating 
plants owned by USCIP & F. These figures refer only to the production of 
cast-iron pressure pipe and exclude the small amounts of related foundry 
items produced. Although the data cover what Iron Age called the "ban-
ner year in the Cast Iron Pipe bus ines s , " 1 8 there was still a substantial 
variation in output during this period. In particular, the total output of the 
plants—especially the smaller ones located in the North—dropped during 
the winter months. This was no doubt due to the fact that water pipe 
cannot be put down in the North during that period. Variation in the total 
amount produced was in large part the result of plant shutdowns and 
reductions in output at the small and medium-sized plants. The large 
plants, which tended to have lower average accounting costs, had lower 
proportional changes in output. 
Let us consider four types of cost. First, there was the cost of pig iron. 
We ignore this category of cost because pig iron was used in constant 
proportion to output. The cost of iron per ton was roughly two-thirds of 
the total cost , at the factory gate, of output per ton. Second, there were 
the direct costs, largely labor and fuel. These also tended to vary in 
proportion to output, although there appears to have been some economy 
involved if the plant was operated at full capacity. Third, there were 
indirect costs , which included insurance, taxes, and certain salaries but 
which were mainly attributable to repair and replacement of equipment. 
The monthly data reveal that indirect costs were sometimes positively 
related to output, although not as strongly as direct costs, and in other 
cases negatively related. The fourth type of cost is inventory cost, which 
is itself composed of the costs of maintaining output inventory and input 
1 8 Iron Age , May 24, 1906, at 1698. 
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inventory. Supply inventories, as is well known, are a major source of 
economies. Note that output inventories are also inconsistent with the 
assumption of constant costs in production. 
For the moment, the focus will be the plant at Louisville, which may be 
thought of as the representative plant. It is of medium size, not located too 
far north or south, and exhibits an average degree of variability in its 
sales, output, and other series. Eight monthly data series compiled from 
records of USCIP & F are presented in Table 2. If we focus on the first 
four columns (sales, inventory, output, and iron used, all in tons), several 
patterns emerge. First, sales are not steady through the year but dip 
severely in the winter months. It is important to emphasize that this figure 
represents the tonnage of pipe leaving the plant each month ("net sales at 
the works") and not the tonnage which the firm had promised that month 
to deliver. 1 9 The slack period from December to March resulted because 
cast-iron pipe could not be installed in northern regions. The variability of 
output is less than for sales. It never reached the same low levels as sales, 
nor did it match the peak monthly sales figure. This is one type of evi-
dence that would tend to support the view that these plants did not have 
constant average costs. 
The next set of figures in Table 2 that are of immediate interest are the 
direct (labor and materials) and indirect (repair and replacement) costs. 
Although a glance at the figures will not reveal this, direct costs are more 
closely related than indirect costs to monthly output levels. The 
coefficient of correlation between output and direct costs is .860, and 
between output and indirect costs - . 3 4 3 . These are not, however, the 
only costs at the plant. The plants also incurred inventory costs for sev-
eral thousand tons of output and pig iron and for other materials such as 
coal, coke, and machine parts. None of this should be surprising, and in 
fact the results here will confirm " the frequent conviction of entre-
preneurs that they are producing under conditions of diminishing average 
c o s t . " 2 0 The standard books on foundry accounting practice, presumably 
written by those in the best possible position to know what foundry costs 
look like, also insist that decreasing average cost is a fact of life. 2 1 
l s " N e t sales at the works" formed part of stock-flow calculation. N e w product ion 
( " y i e l d " in Table 3) was added to the previous end-of-month inventory and net sales were 
subtracted from this sum to obtain the new end-of-month inventory. The reader can easily 
check this in Table 3. This suggests that " n e t sa les" refers to the amount that left the plant 's 
yard . Whether the firm also received payment that month is another matter, and the ledger 
offers no clue about this. The terms for municipal cont rac ts were probably fairly s tandard , 
al though there are some instances in which firms offered two bids, the lower bid to apply if 
payment was made before a certain date. 
2 0 John Hicks, Value and Capital (1939) at 82. 
2 1 See , for example , Robert E. Belt, Foundry Cost Accounting (1926) at 54 -55 . 
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V I . C O S T S A N D O U T P U T 
Table 3 shows the location, maximum monthly output, and some of the 
elements of production cost for each plant. Plant size, as measured by 
maximum output, varied by a factor of nine, from 776 tons for West 
Superior to 7,224 tons for Addyston. The smallest plant was clearly a 
high-cost, peak-load unit, as were the other two small northern plants at 
Columbus and Buffalo. Interestingly, their peak monthly output rates 
(1,433 and 2,157 tons) were roughly two and three times that of West 
Superior. The next group of plants falls in the range from 3,740 to 4,269. 
There were four of these. The four largest plants, Addyston, Bessemer, 
Burlington, and Scottdale, had capacities that fell roughly between 5,300 
and 7,300 tons. The most striking feature of Table 3 is the inverse associa-
tion between capacity and direct and indirect costs. 
Probably the leading influence on plant location was the cost of pig iron. 
This varied from about $12-$13 per ton for the three firms located in the 
South to nearly $15 per ton for the firms located in Pennsylvania and 
northern Ohio. A large part of the output of the southern firms was ex-
ported to other areas, chiefly to industrialized parts of the Midwest and to 
western states, as well as abroad. The lower cost of pig iron contributed to 
the southern firms' tendency to export to other regions, especially since 
they had no particular advantage in terms of direct and indirect costs. The 
plant at West Superior, Wisconsin, probably continued to operate despite 
its higher per-unit production costs because, when transportation costs 
are considered, it could still supply the northern plains states and south-
central Canada at a lower price. 
An important result in Table 4, which presents the means and 
coefficients of variation for several series, is that in all cases but those two 
in which the plants shut down, the coefficient of variation was higher for 
sales than for output. Again, this indicates the existence of some optimum 
range of output that firms attempted to maintain. Furthermore, fluctua-
tions in aggregate firm output were disproportionately borne by the small 
northern plants. The larger northern firms (Addyston, Burlington, and 
Scottdale) had very little output variation but large inventory holdings. 
Note also that output has a coefficient of variation very similar to that for 
direct cost, although slightly smaller in most instances. Indirect cost, on 
the other hand, takes on more proportional variability than output, except 
again in the case of the two firms that shut down for part of this period and 
in the case of Chattanooga, where output was very nearly constant to 
begin with. 
The strong positive relationship between output and direct cost can be 
seen in the correlations between output and direct cost in Table 5. This 
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R E L A T I O N S H I P O F O U T P U T T O D I R E C T A N D I N D I R E C T C O S T S 
C O E F F I C I E N T S O F C O R R E L A T I O N 
Output and Output and 
P L A N T Direct Cost Indirect Cos t 
A d d y s t o n .428 .130 
Ann i s ton .718 - . 2 5 8 
B e s s e m e r .841 .313 
Buffalo* .994 .685 
Bur l ington .911 - . 5 0 0 
C h a t t a n o o g a .532 .575 
Cleve land .942 - . 6 6 4 
C o l u m b u s .889 .806 
Louisvi l le .860 - . 3 4 3 
Sco t tda le .550 .188 
Wes t Superior* .959 .717 
SOURCF..—Same as Table 2. 
NOTF.—These computations are based on twelve monthly observations unless noted otherwise. 
* Buffalo had zero output for six out of the twelve months and West Superior had zero output for five 
out of the twelve months. Consequently, their correlations are based on six and seven observations. 
relationship is somewhat attenuated in the case of the four plants with 
the least output fluctuation (Addyston, Anniston, Chattanooga, and 
Scottdale). The fact that we can obtain rather high correlations for the 
remaining plants does suggest that the costs included in this category are 
part of what one normally thinks of as variable costs. 
Indirect costs showed considerably less consistency. For the smaller 
plants, which experienced long and wide swings in output, an association 
between the level of output and indirect costs is evident (Buffalo and 
Columbus, for example). This suggests that for some sufficiently long 
span of time these costs can be varied, although they were in fact never 
brought to zero. (Even plants which were shut down the whole year had 
substantial indirect costs.) However, where there was steadier output, 
indirect costs showed no correlation or even a negative correlation with 
output . The negative correlation is especially plausible for a plant running 
at full capacity most of the time, since repairs would be deferred to those 
periods when production was slack. 2 2 
2 2 This in terpreta t ion of the pat tern of indirect expendi tures is supported by the figures for 
month ly average cos t . Average indirect cost rose sharply in the winter months for most 
p lan ts , and in several c a se s the absolute level of indirect cost peaked there . Average direct 
cos t s a re also higher in the winter , but not in the same pronounced fashion. This tendency of 
direct cos ts to rise may have been due in part to the t endency of firms to make smaller pipe 
sizes for inventory in the winter . This issue is addressed in the next section. For a more 
detai led d iscuss ion, see my disser ta t ion, supra biographical note , at 147-50. 
T A B L E 5 
222 T H E J O U R N A L O F L A W A N D E C O N O M I C S 
Finally, it should be noted that the period covered by our numbers was 
one in which a remarkable expansion of plant capacity took place (al-
together three new plants were built in Alabama in 1905 and 1906) and 
existing foundries produced at unusually high ra tes . 2 3 If it is true that 
plants do typically operate over the range for which average costs rise, we 
should be able to find evidence of it in these data. 
V I I . E S T I M A T I O N O F S H O R T - R U N C O S T F U N C T I O N S 
The data we have for these plants, while remarkably detailed, are un-
fortunately limited to twelve observations. This will necessarily restrict 
the analysis to costs that are closely related to current output; however, if 
"direct cost" is essentially the same as the economist 's "variable cost," 
we have what we are looking for. Substantially longer series would be 
needed to investigate a model of inventory holdings or depreciation ex-
pense. 
Table 6 presents the results from a regression of the natural log of direct 
cost on the natural log of output (In Q) and a trend variable. 2 4 The 
coefficients on In Q are low, especially for those plants, such as Chat-
tanooga and Scottdale, that had small variations in output. These 
coefficients, most of which are significantly less than one, might be inter-
preted as evidence of declining average variable cost. But low coefficients 
tend to occur where output variation is low, so it might be the case that we 
have an errors-in-variables problem. However, this regularity is also con-
sistent with omitted variables bias. For example, larger pipe is cheaper to 
produce per ton than smaller pipe. If small pipe sizes are produced when 
output is low, this could bias the coefficient. It is also possible that pipe of 
any given size may be cheaper to produce under certain conditions, 
perhaps when aggregate demand is high and work can be scheduled more 
efficiently. This suggests that we might try to isolate variables that are 
correlated, not only with our omitted variables, but also with output. We 
use a two-step procedure in which the log of actual output is regressed on 
the lagged values of variables associated with the state of the economy, 
where these are also expressed in log form. The predicted value of output 
implied by the regression results is then used as an additional explanatory 
2 3 See the reports in Iron Age from its New York and Birmingham correspondents 
throughout this period. 
2 4 An understandable objection to these regressions is that a sample size of twelve is fairly 
small. My alternative, however, was to not use the data at all. Since the statistical results 
here are in close agreement with results from other industries, it seemed sensible to present 
them. Moreover, these findings are not crucial to the analysis but simply co r robora t e and 
extend the evidence in Sections IV through VI. 
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T A B L E 6 
O R D I N A R Y L E A S T S Q U A R E S E S T I M A T E S O F P L A N T C O S T F U N C T I O N S 
L O G O F D I R E C T C O S T S R E G R E S S E D O N L O G O F O U T P U T 
Plant In te rcep t In Q Time 
Durb in -Watson 
J -S ta t i s t i c S S E R2 
A d d y s t o n 5.34 .55 .017 2.25 .0081 .86 
(5.75) (5.22) (6.56) 
Ann i s ton 3.47 .79 .010 1.60 .0628 .61 
(1.56) (2.88) (1.36) 
B e s s e m e r 5.02 .60 .008 1.53 .0115 .85 
(5.86) (5.84) (2.56) 
Bur l ington 4.82 .63 .005 2.72 .0102 .87 
(6.28) (7.10) (-15) 
C h a t t a n o o g a 6.40 .41 .003 1.75 .0298 .32 
(3.05) (1.58) (.53) 
C leve land 3.69 .74 .011 .85 .0236 .95 
(8.20) (13.52) (2.39) 
C o l u m b u s 2.21 .94 .025 1.87 .0161 .96 
(4.41) (13.54) (5.62) 
Louisvi l le 4.07 .70 .016 2.33 .0086 .95 
(7.40) (10.27) (6.08) 
S c o t t d a l e 5.95 .48 .009 2.37 .0099 .56 
(4.87) (3.38) (2.21) 
N O T E . — T h e number of observations is twelve in each case, and parentheses indicate /-statistics. The 
Durbin-Watson ^-statistic is intended here as in the other tables to be suggestive rather than definitive. 
Standard tables give confidence intervals only for A' s= 15. "Time" is a trend variable that takes on the 
values 1, 2 , 3 , . . . , 12. 
variable in the estimation of the cost function. This is related, of course, 
to the instrumental variables approach, the difference being that we use 
both the actual and the "p red ic t ed" values of In (9 . 2 5 
I 
2 5 T h e four e x o g e n o u s va r i ab les a re lagged monthly va lues of factory employmen t , pig-
iron p r o d u c t i o n , rai l road freight ton-mi les , and building pe rmi t s . Es t imates using cur rent 
va lues of these var iab les g ive essent ia l ly the same resu l t s . This method of est imation is 
re la ted to a tes t for s i m u l t a n e o u s equat ion bias proposed by J . A. H a u s m a n , Specification 
T e s t s in E c o n o m e t r i c s , 46 E c o n o m e t r i c a 25 (1978). This t echn ique is directed at the first of 
t w o e r ro rs - in -var iab les p r o b l e m s , namely , that " t r u e output ' " is measured with e r ror be-
c a u s e the mix of p ipe s izes va r ies from mon th to month and may vary with ou tput . T h e 
s e c o n d poss ible e r ro r s - in -var iab les p rob lem ar ises if r e sources ("costs* ' ) are commit ted 
be fo re ou tpu t is p r o d u c e d and ou tpu t itself is a r andom var iable . So , for example , a plant 
m a y intend to p r o d u c e the s a m e a m o u n t of output each month and hire the same amoun t of 
r e s o u r c e s but find that ac tua l ou tpu t f luctuates because of r andom forces . An economet r i c 
inves t iga t ion of the p l a n t ' s co s t funct ion would mistakenly infer zero marginal cos t s . I have 
not dea l t with this poss ib le sou rce of d o w n w a r d bias because the ou tpu t changes at the 
p lan t s a re substant ia l and s e e m to have been del iberate . T o a large ex ten t they were in 
r e s p o n s e to seasonal var ia t ions in d e m a n d . The statistical issue is d i scussed in a slightly 
different con tex t in Mil ton F r i e d m a n . C o m m e n t , in Bus iness Concen t ra t ion and Public 
Po l icy (1955). Similar c o n c e r n s also ar ise in the case of p roduct ion funct ions. See Yair 
M u n d l a k and Irving H o c h , C o n s e q u e n c e s of Al ternat ive Specifications in Est imat ion of 
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T A B L E 7 
T W O - S T A G E E S T I M A T E S O F P L A N T C O S T F U N C T I O N S 
L O G O F D I R E C T C O S T S R E G R E S S E D ON L O G O F O U T P U T A N D P R E D I C T E D 
L O G O F O U T P U T 
Plant Intercept In Q In Q Time 
Durbin-
Watson 
J-Stat is t ic SSE R2 
Addyston 4.09 .50* .20 .019 2.47 .0077 .87 
(1.87) (3.54) (.64) (4.88) 
Anniston 1.70 .75 .26 .009 1.79 .0619 .62 
(.31) (2.42) (.36) (1.08) 
Bessemer 6.83 .76* - . 3 7 .008 1.47 .0072 .90 
(6.26) (6.77) ( -2 .20) (3.14) 
Burlington 5.35 .64* - . 0 7 6 - . 0 0 1 2.71 .0101 .87 
(2.27) (5.63) ( - .24) ( - .11) 
Chattanooga 13.50 .82 - 1 . 2 9 .009 1.21 .0106 .76 
(5.91) (4.18) ( -3 .82) (2.37) 
Cleveland 3.87 .74* - . 0 2 7 .010 .82 .0235 .95 
(3.18) (10.68) ( - .16) (1.38) 
Columbus 3.22 .99 - . 1 9 .018 2.04 .0150 .96 
(2.70) (10.11) ( - .76) (1.86) 
Louisville 5.25 .81* - . 2 6 .016 1.76 .0051 .97 
(7.80) (11.02) ( -2 .35) (7.28) 
Scottdale 8.59 .63* - . 4 6 .003 2.56 .0072 .68 
(4.55) (4.04) ( -1 .73) (.48) 
NOTE.—The remarks at Table 6 apply. An asterisk indicates that the coefficient is significantly different 
from one at the 5 percent level. 
Table 7 presents the results from this method. Note that the coefficient 
on quantity for Bessemer, Chattanooga, Louisville, and Scottdale is 
greater here than for^the earlier equations based on In Q alone. Moreover, 
the coefficient for In Q is significantly different from zero and negative in 
these four cases. This suggests that the low estimates arrived at earlier 
were due to the exclusion of factors that were correlated with quantity but 
that exerted an independent negative influence on costs. Since large pipe 
was cheaper to produce per ton, and since large pipe tended to be pro-
duced in the spring and during upswings imthe business cycle, lower costs 
per ton associated with increases in a In Q (which is simply a linear 
combination of the logs of several aggregate variables) might simply 
reflect the lower cost for large pipe. For the other plants, our estimates 
resulted in coefficients that are essentially unchanged from what OLS 
provided. 
Cobb-Douglas Production Funct ions, 33 Econometrica 814 (1965), and Arnold Ze l lne r , J . 
Kmenta , and J . Dreze, Specification and Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Product ion F u n c t i o n 
Models, 34 Econometr ica 784 (1966). 
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T A B L E 8 
C A P A C I T Y , A N D M A R G I N A L A N D A V E R A G E D I R E C T C O S T S 
Capaci ty 
(Maximum 
Monthly Output ) 
( 1 ) 
Coefficient 
on In Q 
(2) 
Average 
Direct Cost 
(3) 
Est imated 
Marginal Cost 
(4) 
Addys ton 7,224 .50 $4.60 $2.30 
Anniston 4.269 .75 5.92 4.44 
Bessemer 5,316 .76 5.49 4.17 
Burlington 6.147 .64 5.13 3.28 
Chat tanooga 3,740 .82 5.36 4.40 
Cleveland 4,034 .74 5.16 3.82 
Columbus 1,433 .99 7.05 6.98 
Louisville 4.018 .81 5.54 4.49 
Scot tdale 5.848 .63 4.64 2.92 
NOTE.—The correlation between columns ( 1 ) and (2) is - . 9 6 4 . between (1 ) and (3) - . 8 7 5 , and (1 ) and 
(4) - . 948 . 
A curious empirical regularity emerges from the results in Table 8. It 
turns out that there is a very startling relationship between the estimated 
coefficient on In Q and the size of a plant. Using maximum monthly output 
as our measure of plant size, we find that the coefficient of correlation 
between plant size and this estimate is - .964. Since the cost functions are 
of the form C = AQli, marginal cost is equal to fiAQ'3'1 or (CIQ)fi (i.e., 
average cost times /3). Consequently, as Table 8 reveals, larger plants not 
only have lower average direct costs but lower marginal direct costs as 
well. 
A diagrammatic exposition of this situation is presented in Figure 2. We 
see that it is possible to obtain lower average direct costs, but only by 
sacrificing some flexibility. An economic reason for this might be that 
large plants rely more on institutional arrangements and explicit delinea-
tion of duties to organize workers. Consequently, changes in the rate of 
production are more difficult for large plants, because positions and re-
sponsibilities have to be created, removed, or modified as output is 
changed. These are expenses a firm will not gladly endure for short-run 
changes. Regardless of the particular causes, this appear to be a finding 
that has a place in economic reasoning. George Stigler suggests that firms 
adapt to uncertainty by using technologies that are flexible. 2 6 One way of 
adapting, of course, is by flattening average cost curves. According to the 
results here, another way of meeting variable demand is by constructing 
2 6 George Stigler, Product ion and Distribution in the Short Run. 47 J. Pol. Econ . 305 
(1939). 
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DIRECT 
COST 
S h o r t - R u n 
Direct Cost 
OUTPUT 
F I G U R E 2 
some smaller plants which have more flexibility in their use of labor and 
fuel but which as a result have higher costs, including higher marginal 
costs. 2 7 
One more technical step is possible with these data. It is, of course, 
very likely that even after we have taken into account the effect of actual 
output and expected output on costs, some factors determining costs 
have been neglected. If these factors are common across several or all 
plants, it might be useful to employ one of the methods developed for 
handling seemingly unrelated regressions. The method used here is the 
generalized-least-squares approach to seemingly unrelated regressions 
proposed by Arnold Zellner. 2 8 This method uses the estimated variance-
covariance matrix of residuals obtained from the ordinary least squares 
estimation of each equation. Results from this technique are shown in 
Table 9, where we see that the salient features of our earlier estimates are 
preserved. Moreover, a one-tailed test of the hypothesis that the true 
2 7 The view that small plants are more flexible is supported by o ther data. Recall that 
Table 5 contains the coefficients of correlation be tween output and indirect (repair and 
replacement) costs . The relationship between these two series is clearly strongest at Chat-
tanooga and Columbus and at the two plants we have excluded from our regressions because 
they were shut down par t of the t ime. These are also the four smallest plants of the eleven, 
indicating that so far as indirect cos t s are concerned, these costs at small plants had a lower 
fixed or lump-sum element . 
2 8 Arnold Zellner, An Efficient Method of Estimating Seemingly Unrelated Regressions 
and Tests for Aggregation Bias, 57 J. Am. Statistical Assoc. 348 (1962). 
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T A B L E 9 
T H R E E - S T A G E S E E M I N G L Y U N R E L A T E D E S T I M A T E S O F P L A N T C O S T F U N C T I O N S 
L O G O F D I R E C T C O S T S R E G R E S S E D O N L O G O F A C T U A L A N D L O G O F P R E D I C T E D O U T P U T 
Plant Intercept In Q In Q Time 
A d d y s t o n 2.77 .52* .32 .020 
(1.83) (6.87) (1-53) (6.25) 
Annis ton 6.07 .75 - . 2 8 .012 
(1.46) (5.31) ( - . 5 2 ) (1.51) 
B e s s e m e r 7.13 .82* - . 4 7 .008 
(8.89) (9.49) ( -3 .65) (3.14) 
Burl ington 5.17 .62* - . 0 3 5 - . 0 0 0 2 
(3.29) (11.67) ( - . 1 8 ) ( - .050) 
Cha t t anooga 12.72 .67* - 1 . 0 4 .008 
(9.41) (5.35) ( -5 .12) (2.49) 
Cleveland 2.94 .77* .64 .014 
(3.05) (15.18) (.47) (2.19) 
C o l u m b u s 4.50 1.04 - . 4 2 .010 
(3.88) (17.17) ( -2 .21 ) (1.20) 
Louisvi l le 5.56 .86* - . 3 4 .015 
(10.67) (16.68) ( -4 .36 ) (7.25) 
Scot tda le 9.23 .66* - . 5 6 .001 
(7.40) (8.47) ( -3 .54 ) (.24) 
NOTE.—The remarks at Tables 6 and 7 apply. 
value of the returns parameter is equal to one can be rejected at the 5 
percent level for all plants but Anniston and Columbus. These results 
imply that average variable or direct cost decreased with increases in 
output , and this carries with it the conclusion that monthly output rates 
were in the range over which total average cost was falling. 
One more point should be mentioned. Some elements of indirect cost 
such as repairs to machinery and equipment were incurred at positive 
output rates, but not if plants were shut down only temporarily. The daily 
repair of the cupola is an example of this. Since we excluded such items, 
the fixed avoidable cost is probably much greater than our figures on 
direct costs suggest. It is true that we could have added indirect costs to 
direct costs and used this sum to estimate a "'particular expenses'" func-
tion. Unfortunately, this technique would also make estimation more 
difficult since, as we saw, indirect costs as a whole bear no necessary 
relationship to output and may even be negatively related. Yet, especially 
with this sort of finding for indirect costs, and remembering that we have 
not incorporated the expense of inventory in our measure of costs, these 
results provide strong support for the view that incremental variable 
costs for these plants were less than average variable cos ts . 2 9 
2 9 T h e results in this section are consistent with o ther work on cost functions. See the 
ex t ens ive survey by A . A. Wal te rs , Production and Cost Funct ions , 31 Econometr ica 1 
(1963). 
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VIII. C O N C L U S I O N S 
This study has been devoted to the investigation of a syllogism which 
begins: Increasing returns are incompatible with competition. This prem-
ise has been the subject of extensive theoretical work and stands largely 
unchallenged. One exception occurs if there are no costs to having idle 
plants and an infinite number of plants stand ready to satisfy a particular 
rate of demand at minimum average cost. In the more realistic case where 
there are some fixed costs, the existence of falling short-run average cost 
will imply that there can be no competitive solution to the problem of 
allocation in the market, a problem recognized since Viner first presented 
his analysis of U-shaped average cost curves. In the case where falling 
average cost is a consequence of expenses that cannot be avoided in the 
short run, familiar results from the study of natural monopolies tell us that 
marginal cost pricing, which is what competition implies, will not sustain 
the industry. 
The application of these findings demands some care, because the 
theoretical models are not perfect representations of actual markets. For 
example, the models assume that recontracting is costless and that all 
plants are located at a single point. Yet it seems reasonable that slight 
deviations from the point at which a competitive equilibrium exists will 
not create major difficulties if it is costly to shop around. The dispersion of 
plants seems at first glance to work the same way, but the effect of 
transportation costs is actually to cluster plants in small groups. Typically, 
several plants are located close together because of some site advantage. 
(For example, the six Addyston defendants were located near the 
Alabama-Tennessee border and along the Ohio River and sold nearly half 
their output in the mid-1890s to the Chicago area alone.) In such cases, we 
can treat a group of firms as though they were located at the same spot and 
supplying a distinct area. This accentuates the problems for competition 
since each plant has a comparatively large share of the relevant market. 
These observations do suggest why this industry ran into real difficulty 
only when conditions got bad, as they did all through the 1890s. since the 
normal market frictions were not sufficient to ensure stability. 
The second premise in this syllogism is that cast-iron pipe manufacture 
was carried out under increasing returns, and I have given considerable 
attention to the nature of costs in this industry. This attention is justified 
because detailed plant cost data are rare, because new facts concerning 
Addyston deserve a thorough presentation, and because the nature of 
costs lies at the heart of the analysis. The major results are: (1) average 
direct and indirect costs are larger at smaller plants; (2) a substantial 
portion of monthly plant costs does not depend on current output; and (3) 
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there is no evidence of rising marginal cost and in fact the plants typically 
operated under conditions of falling marginal cost. These cost conditions 
are inconsistent with any rigorously defined notion of competition. 
There is much more that can be said about Addyston and the issues it 
raises. For example, the reason we know so much about this case is that a 
stenographer copied cartel documents in the hope that the cartel 's buyers 
would sue, using his evidence, and share the damages with him. Why did 
all the cities he contacted refuse his offer, leaving prosecution of the case 
to the federal attorney? In fact, the purchasers submitted affidavits on 
behalf of the defendants. Another interesting question arises out of the 
fact that United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry merged following 
Judge Taft*s decision and at the same time that a merger wave that was to 
involve nearly half of U.S . industrial capacity was picking up steam. What 
role did judicial interpretation of the Sherman Act and Addyston Pipe play 
in the formation of USCIP & F and the merger wave? But these and other 
questions must be deferred to another time. 
